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The Babylonian Epic of Creation (Enuma Elish) exhibits no 
worries about the authoritativeness of the story of creation that 
it tells, beginning confidently without referencing the source 
of the information. Since there could have been no witnesses 
except the gods to the events of creation this could be problem-
atic. However, the Enuma Elish is a sacred text, recited in the 
temple at Babylon every year at the New Year Festival and so 
carries the authority of Marduk himself.
In early Greek cosmologies, however, we do find that writers 
are concerned to establish the source of their account. In the 
Theogony Hesiod tells us that near Mt. Helicon he met the 
Muses, daughters of Zeus he reminds us, and they gave him the 
power to sing of the future and the past, and of the family of the 
immortal gods. Of the Presocratics whose claims to authority 
have survived, Parmenides tells us that the daughters of the Sun 
took him to visit a goddess who unfolded the nature of the uni-
verse to him, and Empedocles also claims that his account is 
“from a god”. Plato in the Timaeus reacts against this tradition 
by calling his account of creation only “a likely story”. Lucre-
tius, as an Epicurean, should not be able to claim any divine 
insight to aid him in his account of the nature of the universe; 
the gods do not communicate with mortals, and events that 
happened long ago can only be worked out by applying reason 
(ratio) to the traces (uestigia) they have left behind. The ques-
tion of what epistemological status should be granted to events 
98151_Entretiens_LXI_215_04_Campbell.indd   149 12/05/15   13:41
150 GORDON CAMPBELL
in prehistory is controversial. We may be tempted to regard such 
events as adêla physei (“things unclear by their nature”) and 
thus things that should be suitable for the method of multiple 
explanations, just as the celestial and terrestrial phenomena in 
Book Six. But Lucretius only admits multiple explanations of 
phenomena at one point in Book Five, when he says that fire 
could have come down to earth in two different ways. For the 
rest he is dogmatic and admits no alternatives. It seems that we 
can trace back the events of the past by the traces they have 
left.
It may come as a surprise that Lucretius speaks just as confi-
dently of the creation and destruction of the world as do the 
Presocratics. He tells us he is uttering oracles more certain than 
those of the Pythian priestess, setting himself up as a rival in 
cosmological authority to the oracle of Apollo at Delphi. In this 
paper I trace the source of this oracular authority that he claims, 
examining how he is able to claim such prophetic powers, and 
how he establishes himself in the cosmological tradition. Perhaps 
surprisingly, there is a long tradition of the Epicureans claim-
ing to speak with oracular authority about the universe. Any 
Epicurean it seems has access to oracular knowledge of the past, 
present and future of the world, since Epicurean cosmology 
gives exact knowledge of the nature of the universe, and armed 
with this we can speak with confidence about past and future 
events. 
In particular I examine the tension between the way Epicurus 
is treated as an oracular authority by his followers, and the pos-
sibility offered by the doctrine that all Epicureans can discover 
the secrets of the universe for themselves, and thus free them-
selves from fear of the gods and of death.
1. Some Babylonian background
The Enuma Elish does not question the authenticity of its 
account of creation. It is a sacred text, and therefore authoritative. 
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Recited at the temple in Babylon at the New Year festival each 
year, it is part of a ceremony of cosmic renewal.
“When heaven above was not yet named
Nor earth below pronounced by name,
Apsu, the first one, their begetter
And maker Tiamat, who bore them all,
Had mixed their waters together,
But had not formed pastures, nor discovered reed-beds;
When yet no gods were manifest,
Nor names pronounced, nor destinies decreed,
Then gods were born within them.” (Trans. S. Dalley)
There are very many things that may be said about this passage, 
but for my purposes here I shall mention just a couple. First, as 
I say above, the account is dogmatic and admits of no doubt or 
questioning on the part of the reader or listener. The writer or 
singer clearly does not expect anyone in the audience to put up 
their hand and ask how these things can possibly be known. 
We are, after all, told quite explicitly that only the two divinities 
Apsu (the masculine sweet water principle) and Tiamat (the 
feminine salt water principle) existed in the beginning, and there 
were not yet any other gods, let alone humans. And anyway, as 
we read on we learn that Apsu is killed early on in the action, 
and that Tiamat is killed later in the final battle between the 
gods. Clearly the account is not given by them, but it is autho-
rised by the New Year ceremony itself, as the poem is recited 
every year in order to legitimate, or re-legitimate, the rule of 
Marduk and the order of the world that he put in place. In the 
Enuma Elish Marduk does more work than his Greek counter-
part Zeus does. He not only grants the gods their honours and 
puts them in their stations but creates both the world itself and 
human beings to be slaves for the over-worked gods. The poli-
tical structure of Babylon is clearly divinely ordained.1 
My second point about this passage is that the literary mode 
adopted is ‘description by negation’. We are informed about 
1 See Stefan Maul’s chapter in this volume.
98151_Entretiens_LXI_215_04_Campbell.indd   151 12/05/15   13:41
152 GORDON CAMPBELL
the time when “skies above were not yet named ... nor earth 
below ... not ... nor ... no gods ... nor names ... nor destinies” 
(emphasis added). This mode is very familiar from Greek and 
Roman accounts of both creation and prehistory, and also of far 
away peoples. The stress is on the difference between then and 
now, or us and them, and so the focus is on the here and now, 
and we can understand the early world or foreign peoples through 
the filter of what we have and know nowadays.2 In the passage 
above the lack of pastures and reed beds shows clearly that the 
writer was aware of the geographical processes that had led 
to the formation of the land of Mesopotamia. In this way the 
account functions as an aetiology of the creation of what we see 
now, and, as any respectable cosmogony must do, it also ‘saves 
the appearances’. That is, the writer of cosmogonies and cos-
mologies must give an account that is not only in accordance 
with observed reality, but also must enable us to work back-
wards from what we see to otherwise unknowable events in the 
past or far away. In this way we get a verifiable account of cre-
ation: the world is the way we see it because of certain events 
in the past, events that cannot be accessed directly but that may 
be approached if we are ready to try to trace back from present 
realities.
2. Some Greek background
When we turn to the earliest Greek cosmogonic literature we 
can see a change. Hesiod clearly feels the need to explain the 
source of his account, and so he claims that his wisdom is divinely 
revealed, at Theogony 22-28:
“And once they taught Hesiod fine singing, as he tended his 
lambs below holy Helicon. 
This is what the goddesses said to me first,the Olympian Muses, 
daughters of Zeus the aegis-bearer:
2 See DAVIES (1987) 265ff. and (1988) 15ff.
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‘Shepherds that camp in the wild, disgraces, merest bellies: we 
know how to tell many lies that sound like truth, but we know 
to sing reality, when we will.’” (Trans. M.L. West)
There are differing views of what Hesiod is doing here. Jenny 
Strauss Clay argues that he is problematizing the truth value 
of his account and warning the reader or listener that they 
shouldn’t take his story at face value. After all, if the Muses can 
tell many lies that sound like truth how can we as mere mortals 
distinguish between the lies and the reality? She compares Homer 
on the theme of representation and reality.3 This is perfectly 
reasonable from a Homeric point of view, since Homer is clearly 
very interested in questions about the truth value of stories. But 
I suggest here that Hesiod is not clever in this way and that 
he is attempting to assert the truth value of his story about 
the origins of the gods and the world. There seems to be no 
other place in his poems where he problematizes the truth of 
his account, as far as I know.
Further, he tells us that the Muses gave him a sceptron of 
laurel, a symbol of Apollonian kingly power, and a divine 
(thespis) voice. Later he tells us that singers come from Apollo 
and kings come from Zeus (Theog. 94ff.). The main function 
of kings that he outlines is to calm disputes with honeyed words 
and to make straight judgements. As Strauss Clay argues Hesiod 
as a singer with his sceptron seems to be assuming for himself 
some of this kingly power and function, and that this becomes 
much clearer in the Works and Days where the making of straight 
judgements becomes more explicit (Op. 8-10):
“Zeus who thunders on high, who dwells in the highest man-
sions. O hearken as thou seest and hearest, and make judgements 
straight with righteousness, Lord; While I should like to tell Perses 
words of truth.” (Trans. M.L. West)
 What may not have been noticed sufficiently is his claim that 
the Muses also granted him at least two parts of the sacred 
Apollonian threefold knowledge (Theog. 32):
3 STRAUSS CLAY (2003).
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“So that I should celebrate things of the future and things that 
were aforetime.” (Trans. M.L. West)
The Muses themselves have all three parts of the sacred three-
fold knowledge, and it seems they may or may not grant it to 
mortals (Theog. 38-39):
“As they tell of what is and what shall be and what was afore 
time, voices in unison.” (Trans. M.L. West)
We are familiar with this formula from the Iliad, where we are 
told that Calchas has been granted all three parts of the Apol-
lonian knowledge (Il. 1, 68-71, emphasis added):
              “Among them arose 
Calchas son of Thestor, far the best of bird-diviners, 
who knew the things that were, and that were to be, and that had 
been before, 
and who had guided the ships of the Achaeans to Ilios 
by his own prophetic powers which Phoebus Apollo had bes-
towed upon him.”
(Trans. A.T. Murray)
We could problematize this claim by arguing that Calchas’ ora-
cular insight was plainly foolish and wrong, and that the sacri-
fice of Iphigenia was a wicked deed that helped nobody. But I 
think in his claim to Apollonian insight Hesiod is simply saying 
that his account has divinely sanctioned truth, and that he is 
not trying to complicate the matter. He is not a ‘clever’ poet 
like Homer. It is surely in the interests of cosmological poets to 
assert the truth of their accounts rather than to throw doubt on 
them.
For further relevant Greek material, it is worth looking at 
Parmenides and Empedocles. They both claim divine inspira-
tion for their stories about the universe. Parmenides tells us 
that the daughters of the Sun came to collect him in a chariot 
and took him to a goddess who took him in and taught the 
nature of the universe (Parmenides, fr. 28 B 1, 22-32 DK):
“And the goddess treated me kindly, and took my right hand in 
hers, and addressed me with these words: ‘Young man, you who 
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come to my house in the company of immortal charioteers with 
the mares which bear you, greetings. No ill fate has sent you 
to travel this road — far indeed does it lie from the steps of 
men — but right and justice. It is proper that you should learn 
all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, and 
the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance.” 
(Trans. G.S. Kirk / J. Raven / M. Schofield)
This is famously problematic, because the goddess teaches him 
both the way of seeming and the way of being, the point of the 
latter being to show that what we think of as reality — the world 
of growth, change, and decay — is just an illusion. Why does 
she bother if the phenomenal world is not real? And why does 
Parmenides bother?4 It seems a sterile argument.
Empedocles similarly claims divine inspiration for his cos-
mology and also appropriates Parmenides’ chariot for his Muse 
Calliope (Empedocles, fr. 31 B 3 DK):
“But gods! turn aside their madness from my tongue
and channel a pure stream from holy mouths.
And you maiden Muse of the white arms, much remembering,
I beseech you: what is right for ephemeral creatures to hear,
send [to me], driving your well reined chariot from [the halls of] 
piety.” (Trans. B. Inwood)
Empedocles is a mouthpiece for the gods and Calliope, his Muse. 
It is worth noting that the prayer is only that she should send 
things fitting for mortal creatures to hear. We assume Empe-
docles has access to deeper, more esoteric knowledge that he is 
keeping to himself, and perhaps his pupil Pausanias. This becomes 
clearer in fragment 31 B 115 DK:5
“There is an oracle of necessity, ratified long ago by gods, eternal 
and sealed by broad oaths, that whenever one in error, from fear, 
(defiles) his own limbs, having by his error made false the oath he 
swore — daimons to whom life long-lasting is apportioned — he 
wanders from the blessed ones for three times countless years, 
4 See KIRK / RAVEN / SCHOFIELD (21983) 239-262.
5 See GARANI (2007) for a fuller discussion of cosmological oaths in Empe-
docles and Lucretius.
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being born throughout the time as all kinds of mortal forms, 
exchanging one hard way of life for another. For the force of air 
pursues him into the sea, and sea spits him out onto earth’s sur-
face, earth casts him into the rays of blazing sun, and sun into the 
eddies of air; one takes him from another, and all abhor him. 
I too am one of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, 
having put my trust in raving Strife.” (Trans. M.R. Wright, with 
alterations)
It is not clear where the oracle of necessity comes from. It may 
simply be his way of saying that the fall of the daimon has to 
happen. And do the gods have a choice about whether to ratify 
the oracle? It is very enigmatic, but the point I want to empha-
size here is Empedocles’ appeal to a higher authority for his 
account. It is not just his opinion that the daimon must fall: it 
is destined by the oracle of necessity. The sin of the daimon is 
made clearer in the Strasbourg fragments (fr. d 5-6):
“Alas that merciless day did not destroy me sooner, before I 
devised [‘for my lips’ in 139 DK] with my claws terrible deeds 
for the sake of food.” (Trans. A. Martin / O. Primavesi)
How the daimon can commit such a sin of slaughter and meat 
eating while in the company of the immortal gods is again 
obscure,6 but on one reading it is destined to happen, and the 
daimon would not be in this world at all if he had not commit-
ted this sin. It can also be read as an account of cosmogony, as 
it seems to provide the answer to Aristotle’s question about how 
the perfect stillness of the sphere can possibly initiate new action 
in the cosmic cycle. Strife enters the sphere through the sin of 
the daimon and blasts it apart, separating once more the four 
elements which had been conjoined and at rest in the sphere, 
thus beginning the endless cosmic cycle again (Aristot. Phys. 8, 
1, 252a5-10):
“And it is just as fantastic to say things are so by nature and that 
one must believe that this is a principle, as it seems that Empe-
docles would say, i.e. that the alternating dominance and motive 
6 See OSBORNE (2005).
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power of Love and Strife inhere in things by necessity and that 
they are at rest in the intervening time.” (Trans. Inwood)
Aristotle seems to take it that Empedocles’ “oracle of necessity” 
is simply a way of saying “it must happen”. I think he is mis-
taken; a power higher even than the immortal gods has given 
the oracle of necessity. What that power is obscure but it seems 
to be beyond even Love and Strife, Empedocles’ two cosmic 
forces.
It may be worth comparing Anaxagoras here. He appeals to 
Nous (Mind) as a cosmic ordering force (fr. B 12 DK):
“And all things that were to be — those that were and those that 
are now and those that shall be — Mind arranged them all.” 
(Trans. Kirk / Raven / Schofield)
Again, we are not told where Mind comes from or if it is the 
mind of a particular god, but my point is here that he feels the 
need to appeal to some power or intelligence beyond our com-
prehension, rather than simply saying that the order of the cos-
mos is simply inevitable.
3.  The ontological status of past, present, and future in 
Lucretius
There remains the question of what ontological status the 
past, present and future have in Epicureanism. Do they really 
exist, and if not how can we speak with any confidence about 
them? Again, just as with earlier Babylonian and Greek sources 
we are speaking of things we cannot have first-hand experience 
of, and so if we do not have some sort of divine inspiration like 
Calchas in the Odyssey this is a problem. Lucretius makes it 
clear that he believes time does not exist on its own but is only 
an ‘accident’ of matter (1, 459-463):7
7 For a much more in-depth analysis of this question see WARREN (2006). 
He argues that the Epicureans are not ‘presentists’ in that they do not deny the 
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tempus item per se non est, sed rebus ab ipsis
consequitur sensus, transactum quid sit in aeuo,
tum quae res instet, quid porro deinde sequatur;
nec per se quemquam tempus sentire fatendumst
semotum ab rerum motu placidaque quiete.
“Time also exists not of itself, but from things themselves 
is derived the sense of what has been done in the past, 
then what thing is present with us, further what is to follow after.
Nor may we admit that anyone has a sense of time by itself
separated from the movement of things and their quiet calm.” 
(Trans. W.H.D. Rouse / M.F. Smith)
He goes on to say in the rest of this passage (1, 464-482) that 
we mustn’t think of the events of the Trojan War as ‘real’ in the 
sense that atoms and void are real, but only as accidents (euenta) 
of matter.
This is problematic because elsewhere he says that we can 
follow the uestigia (“traces”/ “footprints”) of the past (5, 1445-
1447):
   nec multo priu’ sunt elementa reperta.
propterea quid sit prius actum respicere aetas
nostra nequit, nisi qua ratio uestigia monstrat.
“Nor had letters been invented much before,
So what happened before, our age is not able 
to look back on, unless reason shows the traces (uestigia).” (Trans. 
Rouse / Smith)
It seems that we can treat past events as real if we can examine 
the traces they have left in the present world.
However, the ontological status of the future is more prob-
lematic. Lucretius, De rerum natura 1, 459-463, although deny-
ing that time has any independent existence, seems to suggest 
that we can get a sense about quid porro deinde sequatur (“what 
may follow after”), and seems to draw parallels between the 
ontological status of past, present, and future, just as in Hesiod 
existence of the past and future, and that the past, at least, does have some real 
existence for them.
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and Homer (above). The subjunctive sequatur (“may follow”) 
is the only hint in the passage that the future is looser than 
the past and present. It seems so strange that Lucretius would 
admit that we can predict the future in some way, given the 
argument between the Epicureans and Stoics on just this point; 
whether the future can be predicted, and if it can, is it not a 
sign of predestination?8 The position I am arbitrarily taking 
in this paper is that the past and future do have some sort of 
existence and can, within certain limits, be spoken about with 
some confidence.
4. Lucretius on oracles
But to move on to my main argument, I would like to look 
at Lucretius’ claim that he is able to predict the future, and also 
to speak confidently about the creation of the world (Lucr. 5, 
110-116):9
qua prius adgrediar quam de re fundere fata 
sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam 
Pythia quae tripode a Phoebi lauroque profatur, 
multa tibi expediam doctis solacia dictis,
religione refrenatus ne forte rearis 
terras et solem et caelum, mare sidera lunam, 
corpore diuino debere aeterna manere.
“But before I begin to utter oracles on this matter, more solemnly 
and with more certain reason than those which the Pythia declares 
from the tripod and laurel of Phoebus, I will expound to you 
many consolations in words of wisdom, lest by some chance 
bitted and bridled by superstition you think that earth and sun 
and sky, stars, and moon are of divine body and must abide for 
ever.” (Trans. Rouse / Smith)
8 See FURLEY (1966) 13-14. For the sake of time and concision I am ducking 
many questions here and avoiding engaging with the serious studies on this topic. 
See further ASMIS (1984); ALLEN (2001).
9 See further ERLER (2009).
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Here the theme of prophecy becomes explicit: Lucretius’s tea-
chings are prophecies more trustworthy than those of the Del-
phic oracle. There are various levels on which this comparison 
works; on the face of it, as an Epicurean Lucretius would not 
regard the pronouncements of the Delphic oracle as having 
any truth value at all other than accidentally,10 and so, in this 
way, he would not be claiming very much for his doctrines. 
But in another way, given that the Delphic oracle was popularly 
regarded as the most important oracle in the world, Lucretius, 
with a certain irony, taps into popular superstition and appro-
priates it to his didactic purposes. In an almost opposite way, 
however, the contrast is between the certainty of Epicurus’ ‘ora-
cular’ pronouncements and the notoriously ambiguous and dif-
ficult to interpret prophecies of the Pythian priestess. Similarly, 
David Sedley reads an ironic contrast between religious oracles 
and “the philosopher’s rational alternative”: “On this reading, 
Lucretius’ words distance him from approval of (literal) oracles 
as effectively as the way in which, for example, those who praise 
the ‘university of life’ distance themselves from approval of (lite-
ral) universities”.11 Again, Lucretius seeks to replace just such 
religious ‘truths’ as those uttered by the oracles with Epicurean 
truth, and so Epicurus’ doctrines become more directly, and uni-
ronically, the new ‘oracles’. Further, as Lucretius has already told 
us, Epicurus was a god (5, 8), his words are sacred teachings, and 
so may reasonably be regarded as oracular. In this way Lucretius 
really is the prophetes (both “interpreter” and “prophet”12) of Epi-
curus, just as the Pythia is of Apollo. 
So Lucretius situates himself within the tradition of oracular 
cosmology. His oracles will be more certain and accurate than 
those of the Delphic oracle. It may also be worth looking here 
at his account of Empedocles’ cosmological discoveries (1, 734-
739): 
10 Cf. PLUT. De Pyth. or. 398-399; DIOG. OEN. fr. 23 Smith.
11 SEDLEY (1998) 13 n. 59.
12 LSJ s.v. I a3 and I a4.
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hic tamen et supra quos diximus inferiores
partibus egregie multis multoque minores,
quamquam multa bene ac diuinitus inuenientes
ex adyto tamquam cordis responsa dedere
sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam
Pythia quae tripodi a Phoebi lauroque profatur.
“Nevertheless he [Empedocles] and those whom I mentioned 
before, men very much below him by many degrees and far less 
than he, although in making many excellent and divinely inspired 
discoveries (multa bene ac diuinitus inuenientes) they have given 
responses as it were from the holy place of the heart with more 
sanctity and far more certainty than the Pythia who speaks forth 
from Apollo’s tripod and laurel.” (Trans. Rouse / Smith)
Empedocles is presented as Lucretius’ forerunner in oracular 
cosmology. His discoveries similarly are divinely inspired and 
are more certain than the prophecies of the Delphic oracle. I 
am attempting here to build a picture of oracular cosmological 
heritage that goes far beyond just an admission of poetic heri-
tage on Lucretius’ part.13 Philosophy can grant us this oracular 
knowledge of the universe, and Lucretius acknowledges his 
philosophical debt to Empedocles: a divinely inspired forerun-
ner. Lucretius’ main criticism of the Presocratics in his survey 
in Book 1 is that their fundamental elements were too ‘soft’ 
and impermanent. They were ‘wrong’ in that sense, but their 
project was correct. He implicitly compares them to the Giants 
who assailed Olympus. They were great and therein their fall 
was greater (1, 741).14 They ultimately failed where Epicurus 
13 For the opposite argument see SEDLEY (1998) 21-34.
14 As GALE (1994) 43 puts it: “Lucretius’ use of the myth is deliberately 
aimed to shock, by reversing its traditional moral implications”. The Epicureans 
are indeed engaged in a “Gigantic assault upon the heavens”, but this time it is the 
assault of reason and piety upon the superstitious and impious interpretation of 
the heavens as divine. Epicurus himself had made such an assault upon the heav-
ens, but one that rescued humanity from religion rather than destroying the world, 
in his ‘flight of the mind’ in 1, 62-79 (see EDWARDS [1990] 465-466; GALE [1994] 
43-45). Cf. HARDIE (1986) 210: “The points in common with the mythical 
Gigantomachy are as follows:
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was successful. He ventured out beyond the flaming walls of the 
world and brought back the knowledge that we need to dispel 
our fear of the gods (1, 72-79):
ergo uiuida uis animi peruicit, et extra
processit longe flammantia moenia mundi
atque omne immensum peragrauit mente animoque,
unde refert nobis uictor quid possit oriri,
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens.
“Therefore the lively power of his mind prevailed, and forth he 
marched beyond the flaming walls of the world, as he traversed 
the immeasurable universe in thought and imagination; whence 
victorious he returns bearing the prize, the knowledge of what 
can come into being, what can not, in a word, how each thing 
has its powers limited and its deep-set boundary mark.” (Trans. 
Rouse / Smith)
There is a great deal to say on this passage, but for my purposes 
here I just want to show that Lucretius considers that what might 
be considered esoteric knowledge about the universe restricted to 
the gods can be achieved through philosophical inquiry. Epicu-
rus can proclaim on the nature of the universe since he has tra-
versed it in his mind.15
To compare a philosophical doctrine with an oracle is quite 
common16 but Lucretius also has direct Epicurean authority for 
the comparison, since in Vatican Sayings 29 Epicurus himself 
says that he would rather employ the openness of a physiologos 
1. The plan of ascending from earth (terris, 63; Earth is also the mother of the 
giants) to heaven (caeli, 64).
2. The intention of storming heaven by force (the ascent as bellum); here deliber-
ately associated with the idea of destroying fortifications, effringere portarum 
claustra, 70-71, although the gates are broken out of rather than assaulted from 
outside.
3. The need to face the weapons of the gods: 68-69 “quem neque fama deum nec 
fulmina nec minitanti | murmure compressit caelum. The thunderbolt is tradi-
tionally the means by which the giants are cast down.”
15 For a full discussion of this passage see BUCHHEIT (2007). For an excellent 
discussion of the alte terminus haerens see ASMIS (2008). 
16 See WARREN (2002) 186; OBBINK (1996) 568-569.
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and ‘give oracles’ even if he is not understood, than pander to 
popular opinion and so win the praise of the mob:
“In investigating nature I would prefer to speak openly and give 
oracles useful to all people, even if no one understands me, rather 
than to conform to popular opinion and so win the freely scatte-
red by the mob.” (Trans. J.C.A. Gaskin with alterations)
Here we see the curious duality of oracles: both their certainty 
and their difficulty of interpretation. Philodemus also says that he 
and other Epicureans “uttered oracles” about the gods (Piet. 2044-
2045 Obbink), and Cicero, picking up ironically on this Epi-
curean topos, criticises Epicurus’ Principal Sayings as the work: 
in quo breuiter comprehensis grauissimis sententiis quasi oracula 
edidisse, sapientiae dicitur (Fin. 2, 20),17 and in an epigram quoted 
by Diogenes Laertius (10, 12) Athenaeus says of Epicurus (perhaps 
with irony): “this [doctrine] the wise son of Neocles heard from 
the Muses or from the sacred tripods of the Pythia”.
In Vatican Sayings 10, the Epicurean doctrine is implicitly 
associated with the Delphic oracle:18
“Remember that as a mortal by nature and receiving a finite time 
you have ascended through natural philosophy to the infinite 
and have looked down upon ‘what is, will be, and was before’.” 
(Trans. J.C.A. Gaskin)
5. Lucretius and the uates
So far I have glanced at some Greek background to Lucre-
tius’ claims to oracular powers, but it may also be worth looking 
here at something of the Roman context of such claims. 
17 Cf. Fin. 2, 102, and Nat. D. 1, 66.
18 As WARREN (2002) 185 comments: “Epicureanism thought it was able to 
claim this Pythian knowledge because its natural philosophy offered a method of 
comprehensive knowledge, of the infinity of atoms and void, of the infinite variety 
of combinations. Any Epicurean knows all of what was, is, and will be, just like 
the Homeric seer Calchas (cf. Lucr. 1, 72-77)”.
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Early on in his first book Lucretius warns his addressee and 
pupil Memmius that he will have to face the terrible threats of 
the uates. He does not explain exactly who these people are but 
he does associate them with his poetic forerunner, and impor-
tant poetic model, Ennius:19
tutemet a nobis iam quouis tempore, uatum
terriloquis uictus dictis, desciscere quaeres.
quippe etenim quam multa tibi iam fingere possunt
somnia, quae uitae rationes uertere possint
fortunasque tuas omnis turbare timore! (1, 102-106)
“You will yourself some day or other seek to fall away from us, 
overborne by the terrific utterances of the uates. Yes indeed, for 
how many dreams can they even now invent for you, enough to 
upset the principles of life and to confound all your fortunes 
with fear! (Trans. Rouse / Smith)20
ignoratur enim quae sit natura animai,
nata sit an contra nascentibus insinuetur
et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta
an tenebras Orci uisat uastasque lacunas
an pecudes alias diuinitus insinuet se,
Ennius ut noster cecinit, qui primus amoeno
detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam,
per gentis Italas hominum quae clara clueret. (1, 112-119)
19 Cf. OLD s.v. “of Italo-Celtic origin ... cf. Ir. fāith ‘bard’, Welsh gwawd ... 
1 A prophet, seer (regarded as the mouthpiece of the deity possessing him). 
b (w. gen. of the deity possessing him; w. gen of thing foretold). c (as using crude 
and primitive verse forms to deliver his prophecies; in quot., w. derogatory 
ref. to Naevius). d (transf.) an authoritative exponent, ‘oracle’”. Caesar says in 
B. Gall. 6, 14, 5-7 about the Druids: in primis hoc uolunt persuadere non interire 
animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios, atque hoc maxime ad uirtutem 
excitari putant metu mortis neglecto. Multa praeterea de sideribus atque eorum 
motu, de mundi ac terrarum magnitudine, de rerum natura, de deorum immortalium 
ui ac potestate disputant et iuuentuti tradunt. (“Among the first principles they 
want to teach is that souls do not die but cross over from persons to persons, and 
this they consider is a very great stimulus to military courage since the fear of 
death is put aside. Moreover they dispute about many things and hand them 
down to the youth, about the stars and their motions, about the size of the earth 
and the lands, on the nature of the universe, about the power and the ability of the 
immortal gods”); emphasis added.
20 See GOLDSCHMIDT( 2013) 56, n. 74.
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“For there is ignorance what is the nature of the soul, whether it 
be born, or on the contrary finds its way into men at birth and 
whether it perishes together with us when broken up by death, or 
whether it visits the gloom of Orcus and his vasty chasms, or by 
divine ordinance finds its way into animals in our stead, as our 
own Ennius sang, who first brought down from lovely Helicon a 
crown with eternal leaf (perenni fronde) to win a glorious name 
(quae clara clueret) through the nations of Italian peoples. (Trans. 
Rouse / Smith)
Then as the passage goes on Lucretius describes Ennius’ confused 
notions of the fate of the soul after death. The implicit argu-
ment is that it is inconsistent of Ennius to believe in both the 
transmigration of souls and the underworld at the same time. 
Elsewhere Lucretius assimilates himself to Epicurus as the first 
to win the Muses’ crown for teaching the Epicurean system in 
verse (1, 926-930 5 4, 1-5), and also assimilates himself to 
Ennius who is also described as the first to bring down a crown 
of eternal leaf from Helicon for the Italian peoples (1, 117-
119), and further, assimilates himself and Ennius implicitly to 
Empedocles by an extended pun on the latter’s name in the same 
passage (1, 118-119: perenni fronde ... | ... clara clueret), and all of 
them to Homer (1, 124-125: semper florentis Homeri | ...speciem), 
whose ghost, as Ennius says at Ann. 3 Skutsch, appeared to him 
in a dream and proceeded to teach him the nature of the uni-
verse (1, 126 rerum naturam expandere dictis).21
So Lucretius constructs a heritage at once poetic and philo-
sophical; all of them are poets On the Nature of the Universe, 
Homer and Ennius are part of the same tradition as Empedo-
cles and Lucretius, but Homer, especially, teaches a false picture 
of the nature of the universe. And notoriously Ennius claimed to 
be the reincarnation of Homer.22 This makes Homer, Hesiod, 
Ennius and Lucretius all rival poets and revealers of the nature 
of the universe, but Hesiod and Ennius especially claim vatic 
21 Cf. GALE (2001): An elaborate pun on Empedos Kleos (Empedocles).
22 See AICHER (1989).
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status as having received their knowledge either from the gods 
or from earlier uates, such as Homer. 
So, as I see it, Lucretius is locating himself in a long tradi-
tion of vatic or divinely inspired wisdom, and as a rival uates to 
Homer and Ennius, but of course his problem is that he cannot 
have access to the wisdom of the gods except through natural 
philosophy. He cannot claim any Homeric or Ennian visitation 
as the basis of his knowledge of the universe.
6. Ennius, Naevius, Livius, Virgil, and the uates and Fauns
To understand something of this and how it works we need 
to go back deep into Latin verse, an area in which we are now 
guided by Nora Goldschmidt and her wonderful recent book 
Shaggy Crowns: Ennius’ Annales and Virgil’s Aeneid. Goldschmidt 
argues that, despite Lucretius’ association of Ennius with the 
uates who issued terrifying utterances, Ennius himself was keen 
to distance himself from earlier Latin poets who had claimed 
vatic authority (Ann. 206-207 Skutsch):23
     scripsere alii rem
uorsibus quos olim Faunei uatesque canebant
“Others have written on the topic in verses which once the 
Fauns and seers used to sing.” (Trans. Goldschmidt)
According to Goldschmidt Lucretius in De rerum natura 1, 
102-103 “implicitly slides him [Ennius] into the category of 
unreliable seers who are likely to entice his readers from the 
path of true philosophy, turning Ennius’ criticism on his own 
head ...”:24
23 Cf. VARRO, Ling. 7, 36 (quoted from GOLDSCHMIDT [2013] 57): “‘Fauni’: 
Divinities of the Latins ... Tradition has it that they were accustomed to speak 
[fari] the future in the so-called Saturnian verses in wooded spots, from which 
speaking they were called Fauni”.
24 GOLDSCHMIDT (2013) 56, n. 74. Ennius goes against the earlier oracular 
vatic tradition of Naevius and Livius. Cf. ibid. 56: “In linking Naevius and Livius 
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tutemet a nobis iam quouis tempore uatum
terriloquis uictus dictis desciscere quaeres.
“You will yourself some day or other seek to fall away from us,
overborne by the terrific utterances of priests.” (Trans. Rouse / 
Smith)
Lucretius, indulging in a deep archaism in tutemet, evokes not 
only Ennius but Naevius and Livius as well,25 bundling them 
together as vatic poets, despite Ennius’ own distancing of his 
poetry from theirs (1, 102-103). Their work was old-fashioned 
and relied on some sort of divine inspiration from Fauns and the 
like. Ennius’ was modern and reliant only on rational sources. 
But as I say above, Ennius’ insistence that the soul can transmi-
grate between bodies is enough for Lucretius to put him into the 
category of uates.26
Goldschmidt goes on to compare Virgil’s self association with 
the uates, leap-frogging back in time over Ennius, the more to 
claim an even earlier antiquity and therefore authority for his 
account of pre-Roman history (Georg. 4, 392-393, of Proteus’ 
prophetic ability):27 
   nouit namque omnia uates
quae sint, quae fuerint, quae mox uentura trahuntur.
“For the uates knows everything: what is, what has been, and what 
is yet to happen.” (Trans. Goldschmidt)
with the Fauni and uates of the past, chanting their carmina in a primitive metre 
before the arrival of real poems (Greek poemata) and a real poet (poeta) to sing 
them, Ennius consigned his precursors to the realm of pre-civilized verse”. See 
also FISHER (2014) 31-34 for discussion of the same material, concluding (34) 
that “a close examination of the evidence does not support the hypothesis of a 
total rupture with the Saturnian tradition”.
25 OLD s.v. tu 2. Cf. GOLDSCHMIDT (2013) 56, n. 74: “Ennius’ scorn of 
primitive uates also influences a proemial link between the uates and ‘primitive’ 
superstition by Lucretius in the prologue to De rerum natura when he sums up 
the dangers of his philosophical rivals”.
26 Cf. his notorious claim that he can remember being a peacock: memini me 
fieri pauom (Ann. 11 Skutsch).
27 GOLDSCHMIDT (2013) 57-61.
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Virgil here takes us way back into not only archaic Italian 
territory, but also into early Greek territory as I have laid out 
above.28 At the same time, he plays a central role in rehabilita-
tion of the image of the prophetic vatic poet in the Augustans 
period. I would like to suggest that Lucretius is somewhere 
in the middle, both rejecting Ennius’ vatic abilities and also 
claiming the ancient glamour of the uates in order to speak of 
things that are impossible for ordinary humans to have direct 
access to.
7. Lucretius’ account of cosmogony
Finally, I would like to look at Lucretius’ account of cosmog-
ony, and to try to explain how he is able to speak so dogmati-
cally and with such confidence about things that no human can 
have direct access to (Lucr. 5, 416-431):
sed quibus ille modis coniectus materiai
fundarit terram et caelum pontique profunda,
solis lunai cursus, ex ordine ponam.
nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum.
“But next in order I will describe in what ways
that assemblage of matter established earth and sky
and the ocean deeps, and the courses of the sun and 
moon.” (Trans. Rouse / Smith)
My question here is how he could possibly know how the world 
was created, since there were no humans or even gods to witness 
it. He is quite dogmatic about the details of his account. There 
were no gods involved, no intelligent design, and the atoms 
just collided at random in the void over infinite time to create 
nearly infinite types of atomic combinations that led on to the 
28 As GOLDSCHMIDT (2013) 57 puts it: “In a thorough discussion of the idea 
of the uates in Augustan Rome, J.K. Newman showed how Augustan poets, begin-
ning with Virgil and influenced by Varro’s interpretation, reinvented the word 
uates from its scornful use in Ennius’ Annales 7 proem and took it up as their own 
distinct title”. Cf. NEWMAN (1967).
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types of matter, worlds and creatures that we see today. It may 
be worth remembering here that Epicurus argues that there 
can be a large if not infinite shapes of worlds, flat, triangular, 
or even, most ludicrously, spherical (Ep. Hdt. 88), and we may 
want to question how the same mechanism of world formation 
could possibly account for all of these different types of worlds. 
Lucretius seems to be speaking of our world; a flat world 
like a pizza, created by a “strange storm, all kinds of beginnings 
gathered together into a mass” (5, 436-439). Then we get the 
traditional account of the separation of disparate elements, and 
the attraction of like elements to like. Earth elements being heav-
iest sank down to the lowest place, and as they coalesced squeezed 
out the lighter elements that went on to form sea, stars, sun and 
moon (5, 449-508). Our world is perhaps more a like a layer 
cake than a pizza, the heavier parts sank down to the bottom 
while the lighter parts rise to the top. We can infer this from the 
signs we see around us. Lucretius frequently appeals to visual evi-
dence for his arguments about the invisible processes of atomic 
motions.29 I would suggest that Lucretius argues from the ues-
tigia that we see around us; we can only infer that lighter objects 
rise and that heavier objects sink. This is not very scientific, 
I know, but I would suggest that in certain circumstances such 
as cosmogony there can be only one explanation of present and 
past phenomena. It may be telling that the only example of 
the Epicurean multiple explanations method in book five of De 
rerum natura concerns the origins of fire; either it was caused 
by lightning or by trees rubbing together. It doesn’t really mat-
ter how it happened, as long as the gods weren’t involved. In 
contrast, all other phenomena in the past that have led up to the 
world that we see around us can have only one origin. It may 
seem strange in Epicurean terms, but we seemed to be locked 
into a chain of causation, otherwise we could not speak confi-
dently about the origins of our world. 
29 Cf. GARANI (2008) passim.
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8. Conclusion
Of course, we have Epicurus’ own oracular authority derived 
from his flight of the mind as he travelled through the universe. 
He was able to view “the whole universe in mind and spirit” 
(omne immensum ... mente animoque) and to bring back to us 
“what can come into being and what can not” (quid possit oriri, 
quid nequeat) and the “deep-set boundary mark” (alte terminus 
haerens) of what can and cannot be (Lucr. 1, 74-77).30 He has 
surveyed all reality, past, present, and future. He has seen the 
origins of things and their ultimate conclusions. There can be no 
doubt allowed into the workings of the atomic world if we are to 
be able to speak confidently of the cosmos and its origins — this 
might seem strange to come to this conclusion when we have 
recently struggled with the theory of the swerve of atoms that 
allows potentiality into an otherwise deterministic system.31 
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T. Fuhrer: I don’t think that we need to explain Lucretius’ 
claim to make predictions about the future with a personal or 
individual inclination of the author. Can’t he make this claim 
because the explanation of the ‘world’ as an atomistic construct 
and its ‘genesis’ by a mechanistic way presupposes a certain 
‘order’ in what has ‘happened’ and is going to ‘happen’ in the 
future in the world? If so, could we say that Lucretius uses the 
word mundus not just as the conventional term for ‘world’, 
but with exactly the specific meaning of ‘order’?
G. Campbell: A difficult question; certainly he is perfectly 
justified in predicting the future dissolution of the world since, 
just like any atomic compound, the world must be mortal. That’s 
straightforward enough. But the truth value of statements about 
the past and future are very difficult for the Epicureans. They 
can seemingly gain some sort of oracular knowledge of both 
past and future through natural philosophy, but as I see it this 
throws them into the hands of their critics, the Stoics, who argue 
that if we can make accurate statements about the future then 
we must admit that the future is determined, which of course 
is anathema to the Epicureans, who invented the idea of the 
swerve of atoms in order to break such a chain of causation. 
The past is even more difficult. In my paper I have somewhat 
surprisingly (to me) come to the conclusion that past, present, 
and future are deterministically linked if we accept Lucretius’ 
prophetic arguments. There should be more swerviness in the 
nature of the universe. But then how could any Epicurean speak 
confidently about past and future events? I’m not sure about 
any of this. mundus certainly means ‘order’ as well as ‘world’, 
and of course Lucretius has a serious problem in explaining 
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that order can come from chaos without any plan or intelligent 
design. Seemingly it just happened.
K. Schmidt: The oracular elements in Lucretius’ texts appar-
ently stress the fact that cosmological knowledge has the quality 
of a hidden truth and can only be accessed through a seer. When 
compared with older cosmological traditions or approaches (e.g. 
the Presocratics), this element seems to be new. Can there any 
historical developments be named that served as driving forces 
for this specific feature of Lucretius’ approach?
G. Campbell: It seems that cosmological knowledge is esoteric 
for Lucretius, and has to be handed down from an authority, 
namely Epicurus, but, paradoxically, I guess, there is a possibility 
that we can gain this knowledge for ourselves; as we progress 
through De rerum natura we get a sense that as we are taught 
that we are becoming wise, especially if we assimilate ourselves 
to the addressee Memmius. He is told in book five that he can 
work things out for himself without Lucretius’ help. It seems 
that we can progress beyond doctrinal authority, and if we only 
learn the basics we can work things out for ourselves. Another 
paradox.
As for the earlier cosmologists I think Empedocles is Lucre-
tius’ main model, but Parmenides is also important. They both 
claim oracular authority for their cosmological doctrines. Par-
menides says that he was taken in a chariot by the daughters of 
the Sun to a goddess who explained the nature of the universe 
to him. Empedocles has an even stronger truth claim in that he 
says that he is in fact a god and that he is only in this world as 
a fallen daimon. As a divine being he knows the workings of 
the cosmos, the cosmic cycle and the, seemingly parallel, journey 
of the soul. As he prepares to depart this world he imparts his 
teachings to us to aid us in our own cosmic journey. The impres-
sion we get from his poem is of him imparting esoteric knowl-
edge to his pupil Pausanias, but of course this is a fiction and a 
stock feature of didactic poetry that we shouldn’t take at face at 
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value. Just like Lucretius he tells us that we can gain cosmo-
logical wisdom for ourselves, if only we can correct our ‘faulty 
way of thinking’. 
K. Volk: I am intrigued by the use of oracular language not 
only in Lucretius but, as you have shown, in the Epicurean tradi-
tion in general. My question concerns Cicero’s polemical descrip-
tion of the Kyriai Doxai as quasi oracular. His point is obviously 
that these breuiter comprehensae grauissimae sententiae are just 
sound bites without philosophical argument — a jab at the typ-
ical Epicurean genre of the memorable maxim. Is this just Cicero 
poking his typical fun at the culturally and linguistically unre-
fined Epicureans — or is it already the Epicureans who, in label-
ling Epicurus’ utterances ‘oracles’, are not only hinting at their 
supposedly divinely inspired status, but also referring to their 
compact linguistic form reminiscent of the one- or two-liners 
issued by actual oracles?
G. Campbell: There is a long tradition of criticism of the 
Epicureans as unlearned and unrefined, and I guess this feeds 
into Cicero’s criticism. Lucretius hits this on the head with a 
baseball bat with his astonishing range and depth of learning 
and sophistication, but nevertheless Epicurus advises his follow-
ers to avoid the traditional educational curriculum and not to 
worry if they haven’t been through the normal educational sys-
tem, since Epicureanism provides a complete education in itself. 
Beyond that I think Cicero’s Academic leanings would tend to 
prejudice him against a philosophy which you can just learn off 
as if it were a catechism; philosophy should be a matter of dis-
cussion: a live issue on every point. There is something cultish 
about Epicureanism, in that the followers of Epicurus tended 
to treat his utterances as sacred doctrines, reminiscent of the 
Pythagorean sect. But I also think that Epicurus and Lucretius 
are consciously in competition with divinely revealed wisdom. 
It may seem strange to us but may well have had more force in 
antiquity. 
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The literary aspect is interesting since the Kyriai Doxai are 
so epigrammatic, and indeed were carved in stone by Diogenes 
of Oinoanda. They are certainly reminiscent of oracular pro-
nouncements. One problem of course is that oracles were so 
notoriously unreliable. 
R. Brague: La difficulté de distinguer entre poète et prophète 
est effective pour nous, qui nous plaçons à un point de vue exté-
rieur. Mais elle existe aussi, dans certains cas, pour les deux pro-
tagonistes. Elle se joue dans les deux directions. Certains de ceux 
que nous appellerions poètes prétendent à la dignité prophé-
tique, comme al-Mutanabbi (Xe siècle), dont le surnom signifie 
justement “celui qui pose au prophète”, sans parler des roman-
tiques pour lesquels cette pose est une métaphore rarement 
prise au sérieux, même par eux-mêmes. En revanche, l’auteur du 
Coran insiste pour qu’on ne confonde pas son message d’avertis-
seur prophétique avec celui des poètes de son époque (Coran 69, 
41). 
G. Campbell: There are different ways of interpreting this 
problem. Some have said that Lucretius is simply debunking 
prophetic knowledge and authority by his use of oracular lan-
guage and his assumption of the mantle of vatic authority, but 
as I see it he appropriates this oracular knowledge for his own 
purposes: Epicureanism can grant the same cosmological insight 
as that given by Apollo. I’m not qualified to comment on the 
Quran and the attitude of the Prophet about poets versus proph-
ets. I can only guess that there were different attitudes about this 
seeming dichotomy at different times in different cultures.
R. Brague: La comparaison des capacités cognitives auxquelles 
prétend Hésiode avec celles des devins homériques révèle une 
curieuse différence. Alors que Calchas connaît ce qui fut, ce qui 
est et ce qui sera, Hésiode se contente, si l’on peut dire, du passé 
et de l’avenir (Théogonie 32). Le présent aurait-il cessé d’être 
intéressant ?
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G. Campbell: Homer tells us that Apollo has granted Calchas 
knowledge of past, present, and future. I imagine that it is 
important for Calchas to know the present will and disposition 
of the gods in order to divine the solution to the Achaean fleet’s 
inability to set sail for Troy. Hence the sacrifice of Iphigenia. It 
is strange that Hesiod only claims knowledge of past and future, 
grand as these claims are, and not of the present. I guess that he 
can speak of the present since he is living in it. He knows his 
own reality, although he often seems confused about why the 
gods seem so hostile to humans. Knowledge of past and future, 
on the other hand, can only be gained through divinely revealed 
wisdom. The rest of us mortals don’t often meet the Muses 
while we are herding our goats under holy Helicon.
R. Brague: Pourquoi Lucrèce, lorsqu’il décrit la capacité du 
sage à tout contempler sans éprouver de trouble, choisit-il d’ap-
peler cette attitude du nom de pietas (5, 1198). N’aurait-il pas pu 
lui donner le nom d’une autre qualité positive, comme sapientia, 
uirtus, etc.? On comprend qu’il refuse le nom de pietas à la supers-
tition, qui justement se pare de ce terme flatteur. Mais pour-
quoi le conserver là où le comportement recommandé n’a rien 
de religieux ?
G. Campbell: Lucretius seems very radical and unorthodox 
in Epicurean terms in his views on traditional Roman religious 
ideas and practices. As has been shown, Epicurus himself encour-
ages his pupils to engage in religious rites and ceremonies more 
than the average person in order to become more godlike by 
contemplating the divine nature, which is perfectly peaceful 
and the embodiment of ataraxia. Lucretius, on the other hand, 
is fiercely critical of Roman religion. One answer to your ques-
tion may lie in Lucretius’ desire to promote Epicureanism as a 
rival religion. As I say above Epicureanism has a strong cult-like 
feel, and can be considered as a religion in itself, with Epicurus 
as its prophet. Even though the Epicureans are materialists that 
doesn’t mean they are not religious. It is well known that they 
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worshipped Apollo, and indeed Epicurus himself as a god. 
I think the early Christian tradition, especially Lactantius in 
the Divine Institutes, may well have given us a false impression 
of Epicurean religion. There is though still a question hanging 
over Lucretius’ religious ideas. I see him as a devotee of Venus, 
a goddess who is real to him and who’s worship is important 
not just for him but for the well being of the Roman people 
and the world. 
J. Strauss Clay: I do have a question for you related to your 
presentation: you emphasized Lucretius’ use of oracular language 
and its oddness for someone who doesn’t believe in oracles. But 
what do you make of the full-fledged opening invocation to 
Venus, who, we find out, doesn’t exist? And, even worse, most 
of the pleasures she offers turn out to be things to be avoided! 
The final act of stripping the cosmos of its charm is surely the 
ending plague.
G. Campbell: I think Venus does exist for Lucretius. Certainly 
we can see her in our mind’s eye and this is proof of her exist-
ence. She is the pleasure of gods and men, and if we worship 
her correctly we can gain some of her attributes, particularly 
ataraxia. She arrives in Spring and calms the storms of March, 
instilling the desire for all creatures to reproduce. As far as I 
understand him Lucretius is a deeply religious writer and a dev-
otee of Venus. Of course she has a dangerous side as Lucretius 
shows in Book four in his diatribe against love, but without her 
we would not exist and the world would be a sterile place.
I know I’m trying to have it both ways here, but the Epicu-
reans were mocked in antiquity for their religiosity and their 
devotion to religious ceremonies and sacrifices, when, according 
to them the gods couldn’t hear their prayers. But at the same 
time Epicurean prayer was a reality and it’s our problem to 
understand it. The hymn to Venus is a proper hymn in that 
it follows the proper hymnic format. First establish the nature 
of your god and specify their attributes, then make sure your 
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prayer is tied in closely to their attributes. Lucretius prays for 
her to grant peace for the Roman people, which is entirely 
consistent with her nature. Of course she can’t do this directly, 
but if all people were to worship her properly, then there would 
be no more war. The plague has often been interpreted as an 
allegorical tale about the disastrous societal effects of false beliefs 
about the gods. The text as it stands ends in a fist fight over a 
funeral pyre. It is difficult to interpret. We begin in Love and 
end in Strife, and of course Empedocles is always present, but 
the question for both poets is about how we can avoid this out-
come. Both are enigmatic on this point, but we can get some 
guidance from Diogenes of Oinoanda (fr. 56 Smith) in which 
he predicts a possible future golden age of peace and harmony 
when all people have become wise. I think that for both poets 
we have a choice of which god to worship and that this choice 
can affect the outcome not just of our own lives but of the whole 
human race. We don’t necessarily have to end up fighting over a 
funeral pyre. 
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